Russia, Belarus and Ukraine

Ongoing Concerns for University Engagements with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine

Due to the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. response through sanctions and enhanced export controls, and the ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ Governor’s supporting executive order, ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ Boulder’s Office of Export Controls (OEC) views any engagements with Russia, Belarus and Russian occupied regions of Ukraine, as extremely high risk. OEC will reassess and modify, or terminate, current ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ engagements as appropriate, and will recommend avoiding future engagements where there is a direct or indirect connection to Russia or the Russian government—including any entity identified as being “state-owned” or having a military support function. The following three areas are where the most significant concerns are materializing, and as such will be the focus for university involvement:

First – Activities in Occupied Regions in Ukraine.

Through the on February 21, 2022, the U.S. government has increased sanctions on Russia, with a specific and severe level of restriction on economic activity in the occupied regions in Ukraine. In a similar vein to the 2014 (and ongoing) sanctions on the Crimean peninsula, these sanctions generally prevent any U.S. university, including employees thereof, from engaging in economic activity with any person—regardless of citizenship—who is physical present in the regions identified (Donetsk and Luhansk). There are limited exceptions to these broad prohibitions, but it is unlikely that university activities would qualify under the terms (see ). OEC recommends that any ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ employee seek a thorough review of the current state of both the sanctions and the borders of these occupied regions, prior to any new engagements in Ukraine.

Second – Sanctions on Specific Russian (and Belarusian) Entities.

The U.S. government on certain Russian sectors, individuals, and identified state-owned entities. The addition of 120 science and technology focused organizations to the Entity List highlights the expanding scope of these efforts. The current sanctions prohibit transactions with most Russian banks, including Russia's central bank, and university employees will need to cease any economic activity with a , the scope of which is likely to continue to expand. OEC recommends a restricted party screen before any engagement with a Russian or Belarusian company or organization.

There is also increased scrutiny for engagements with foreign organizations that have a connection to a Russian Military End User (MEU), or other identified entity of concern. Universities should not view the MEU or Entity List as all inclusive, and must conduct due diligence to understand the potential relationship between a foreign collaborator—whether an individual, business, or university—and the Russian military.

Third - Exports to Russia (and Belarus).

Due to the escalating export controls in response to Russian aggression, all shipments of goods from a ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ source to Russia, Belarus, and Eastern Ukraine must be reivewed by OEC prior to shipment. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) continues to level up controls on most items destined to Russia and Belarus, including: microelectronics, telecommunications items, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, marine equipment, and aircraft components. BIS has also put restrictions on foreign-produced items that involve U.S. origin software or technology, when exported to Russia or Belarus from outside the United States. Furthermore, BIS has created restrictions on a variety of "luxury goods" destined to Russia and Belarus, and to Russian and Belarusian Oligarchs whereever located. The list of luxury goods spans many sectors, including yachts, jewelry, musical instruments, works of art, collectibles, tapestries, fashion items, perfumes, and liquor.

Moreover, the availability of license exceptions for use with exports to Russia and Belarus, as well as named individuals and entities, has been largely diminished, and the review policy for license applications, for the most part, will be a policy of denial. Please contact OEC prior to any travel to Russia or Belarus as this new traunche of export controls and sanctions can have implications on even a casual, non-business travelor.

Note - Fundamental Research. The definition of “fundamental research” and the ability to use the Fundamental Research Exclusion (FRE) to preclude the application of export controls remains unchanged. FRE only applies to information and technology that results from the fundamental research. It does not apply to physical shipments or releases of controlled data and technology used to achieve the research. The increased number of Russian entities on the BIS Entity List increases the need for careful review. Subject to certain exceptions, most items that could be shipped physical form will now require a government license to be sent to any of the newly added Russian organizations to the Entity List.

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