Adrian Shin

Exchange rates and immigration policy

Anonymous — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 21:40:47 +0000

Exchange rates and immigration policy Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 06/03/2021 - 15:40

Exchange rates and immigration policy

By: Adrian Shin

Abstract:

What explains cross-national and temporal variations in migrant rights? This article argues that policymakers implement more exclusionary or inclusive policies toward migrants in response to exchange-rate fluctuations. Since exchange rates affect the real value of remittances, exchange-rate depreciation of the host state’s currency makes migration less valuable for existing and potential migrants, while exchange-rate appreciation increases the degree of migrant pressure on the host state by doing the opposite. This well-documented relationship between exchange rate valuation and migration movements affects how host country governments craft immigration policy. Under exchange-rate depreciation, policymakers will implement more inclusive policies to deter the “exit” of migrants and maintain a stable supply of labor. Under exchange-rate appreciation, increased migration pressures heighten public anxiety over immigration in the host country, in turn causing policymakers to restrict further immigration by implementing more exclusionary policies. Consistent with the argument, the empirical results show that the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) currency values of migrants’ home countries are positively correlated with more pro-migrant policies in host countries.

Learn more Here: Exchange rates and immigration policy

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Migration and Economic Coercion

Anonymous — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 21:36:53 +0000

Migration and Economic Coercion Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 06/03/2021 - 15:36

Migration and Economic Coercion

By: Brendan J Connell, Samantha L Moya, Adrian J Shin

Abstract:

Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideration for potential sanctioners. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries hosting a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Therefore, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to preempt further migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.

Learn more here: Migration and Economic Coercion

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Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy

Anonymous — Mon, 08 Mar 2021 17:46:36 +0000

Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 03/08/2021 - 10:46

Professor Shin recently published a new article, "Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy". The article explores how inequality affects redistributive tax policies and the responses from both sides of the political spectrum.

Learn more at : Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy

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Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union

Anonymous — Wed, 13 Jan 2021 21:04:07 +0000

Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union Anonymous (not verified) Wed, 01/13/2021 - 14:04

Angin, M, Shehaj, A, & Shin, AJ. Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union. Econ Polit. 2020; 00: 1– 25. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12170.

Published: 06 January 2021

Abstract:

Migration has become a top policy priority of the European Union (EU) in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis. Given the significant ramifications of non‐European immigration for its member states, the EU has implemented a variety of policies to minimize popular backlashes within the borders of its wealthiest member states, which are also popular final destinations for migrants. In this article, we show that the EU offers financial incentives to its migrant‐transit member countries in exchange for holding migrants traveling from the Middle East and North Africa region within their territories. We use a subnational dataset on Southern Italy to examine the effects of migrant arrivals by boat on the amount of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund received by each autonomous region between 2006 and 2018. In addition, we provide a cross‐national analysis of EU expenditures using data on unauthorized border crossings into the EU between 2009 and 2018. We find robust empirical support for the argument that the EU channels more funds to jurisdictions located on the major migrant‐transit routes.

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War, inequality, and taxation

Anonymous — Wed, 13 Jan 2021 20:56:00 +0000

War, inequality, and taxation Anonymous (not verified) Wed, 01/13/2021 - 13:56

Dorr, DC, Shin, AJ. War, inequality, and taxation. Econ Polit. 2020; 00: 1– 29. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12168

Published: 30 October 2020

Abstract:

Existing studies highlight the importance of the compensatory demand among the conscripted poor to explain why wars lead to income and inheritance tax hikes for the rich. We propose a more nuanced argument that war mobilization leads to a class conflict in which the poor want the rich to pay more taxes in exchange for conscription while the rich seek lower taxes because they expect war‐related losses of their wealth. Mass warfare imposes higher tax burdens on the rich only when elites lack economic resources to prevent such policies. Using a panel analysis of up to 18 countries from the late nineteenth century to the 2010s as well as a subnational analysis of Senate roll call votes on tax bills introduced between 1913 and 2008, we corroborate our argument that elites' share of national income conditions how war mobilization shapes the trajectories of tax regimes.

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Immigration and Right-Wing Populism: An Origin Story

Anonymous — Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:20:28 +0000

Immigration and Right-Wing Populism: An Origin Story Anonymous (not verified) Fri, 06/21/2019 - 08:20

Shehaj, A., Shin, A. J., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Immigration and right-wing populism: An origin story. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068819849888

Published: 17 May 2019

Abstract:

Previous studies of right-wing populist (RWP) parties primarily investigate how domestic factors as well as external forces, such as immigration, incite the emergence and electoral success of RWP parties. Studies examining the link between migration and far-right support have found mixed empirical results, using various measures of immigration. In this article, we construct our own measures of immigration that highlight the economic and cultural dimensions of migrant-sending states in relation to migrant-receiving states. Our empirical analysis of 15 Western European countries uses these measures to examine whether the economic and cultural characteristics of migrant-sending states can enhance RWP success in wealthy, advanced democracies. We find some evidence that relatively large economic and cultural differences between natives and immigrants are conducive to RWP support in Western European countries. But the findings suggest that future research should identify and examine other factors that strengthen or undermine the extent to which RWP parties can make electoral gains by focusing on immigration.

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Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy

Anonymous — Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:45:45 +0000

Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy Anonymous (not verified) Fri, 06/21/2019 - 07:45

Shin, Adrian International Studies Quarterly, sqz033, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz033

Published: 17 June 2019

Abstract:

This article argues that substantial natural resource wealth leads to more restrictive low-skill immigration policy in advanced democracies. High-value natural resource production often crowds out labor-intensive firms that produce tradable goods. When these proimmigration business interests disappear due to deindustrialization, also known as the Dutch Disease, the proimmigration coalition weakens in domestic politics. Without strong business pressure for increased immigration, policy-makers close their doors to immigrants to accommodate anti-immigrant interests. Using a newly expanded dataset on immigration policy across twenty-four wealthy democracies, I find that oil-rich democracies are more likely to restrict low-skill immigration, especially when their economies are exposed to foreign competition in international trade. The results supplement the voter-based theories of immigration policy and contribute to an emerging literature on the political economy of natural resources and international migration.

Click here to read the full publication.

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2017 International Political Economy Society Conference

Anonymous — Tue, 28 Nov 2017 17:15:44 +0000

2017 International Political Economy Society Conference Anonymous (not verified) Tue, 11/28/2017 - 10:15

Several ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ Boulder Political Science faculty and grad students attended the 2017 IPES Conference last week to present their most recent research. ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ representatives included ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ faculty Andy Baker, David Bearce, and Adrian Shin. The International Political Economy Society (IPES) “provides an annual forum for scholars of IPE to present their best new work in progress to an informed and critical scholarly audience". The annual conference is centered on a small number (approximately 75 each year) of carefully screened and selected papers. More information about participants and their work can be found on the IPES website.

IPES Website

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Meet Adrian Shin

Anonymous — Tue, 10 Oct 2017 17:45:16 +0000

Meet Adrian Shin Anonymous (not verified) Tue, 10/10/2017 - 11:45

Jeffrey Nonnemacher

Assistant Professor

Joining the faculty at ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ Boulder is a dream come true for Professor Adrian Shin, who started here in the Fall of 2016.

”I love being able to drive only 20 minutes and to be in the mountains,” he said, “and living near the mountains has always been a dream of mine.”

“I had always thought I wanted to be a lawyer, but I realized I didn’t want to work in a law firm for the rest of my life”, which led him to Political Science.

“Political Science is about peoples’ behavior, and their desire to be better off, and sometimes these desires conflict with each other,” he said, “and that conflict raises a lot of fascinating and interesting questions.”

Shin has taught many classes at ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ during his time at the university. This semester he is teaching PSCI 2106: Intro to Public Policy Analysis and PSCI 4193: International Political Economy. Next Spring, he will be introducing a new course, PSCI 4283: Immigration and Migration Policy.

“The class is about why people move, why policy makers shut the doors to immigrants, and what are the effects of people’s movement across borders.”

“I wanted a course for students who wanted to learn more about this issue” he noted, reflecting on the current prominence of the immigration issue in the United States and around the world.

For Adrian Shin, being able to integrate his research into his courses is his favorite part about being a professor at ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ.

“I love talking about my research” he said, which looks at “economic globalization from a historical perspective.”

“I always wanted to travel the world, and I got to see different things and cultures. I was drawn to studying and understanding globalization as a result.”

Shin won the APSA 2017 Best Dissertation Award in the Migration and Citizenship Section, which sought to understand the differences in immigration policy between developed countries.

“My first thought was that I was definitely getting a book contract”, he joked. “It was also unexpected.”

The book manuscript, titled Primary Resources, Secondary Labor, which is based off his dissertation, “looks at the development of immigration policy of 29 countries.”

Shin is also working on a second book, titled War, Elite Competition, and Economic Globalization, which he quipped as “basically what we see on Game of Thrones.”

The book focuses on the “effects of mass warfare on economic policies” and “how war reshapes the political competition between elites in the national policy-making process.”

When he is not researching or teaching, he enjoys exploring ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ and traveling the world, especially Europe.

“I have a lot of friends in the Netherlands and all over Europe, so I really enjoy traveling and visiting with my friends in Europe.”

According to Shin, working on a college campus affords him an opportunity not many other professions offer: the opportunity to connect with students.

“I love how I get to blend in with ŷ��ڱ��Ƶ students,” he noted, “I act like a student on my non-teaching days.”

“Humans are students forever”, he observed, “and a college campus is the perfect place to foster that continued learning.”

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Tyrants and Migrants: Authoritarian Immigration Policy

Anonymous — Tue, 19 Sep 2017 15:28:23 +0000

Tyrants and Migrants: Authoritarian Immigration Policy Anonymous (not verified) Tue, 09/19/2017 - 09:28

Abstract:

This article examines the determinants of immigration policy toward low-skilled workers across 13 relatively wealthy autocracies after World War II. I argue that authoritarian immigration policy is a consequence of an autocrat’s redistributive policy. As the distribution of resource rents in rentier autocracies reduces the incentive of domestic labor to enter the labor force, rentier states rely on migrant workers to meet the demand for low-skilled labor. Autocrats without resource rents, however, lack capacity for redistribution, so they use policies that provide people with wages in exchange for their labor while restricting immigration. Using a policy index that measures the extent to which low-skilled migrant workers can get into a country in a given year, I find strong evidence for this argument across 13 autocracies in the post-World War II era.

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