CPSR Opinion and Analysis

A Social Constructivist Analysis of the Afghanistan War

Anonymous — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:03:38 +0000

A Social Constructivist Analysis of the Afghanistan War Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 03/28/2024 - 11:03 Nikhitha Garaga

The War on Terror has pervaded socio-political rhetoric in the United States for over two decades, intermingling itself over time with the Western democratic ideal, permeating domestic policy and foreign relations. Simply put by Muhammad Ishaque Khan, a scholar of Peace & Counterterrorism Studies, “Afghanistan is an enigma, and no one has yet reached the key which may resolve it” (Khan 2021).

As such, I will not attempt here to offer a decisive analysis of the Afghanistan War, as that would be painfully reductive, but to examine the US’s strategy under the lens of Social Constructivism, which can be defined as the “idea that individuals within societies construct the ‘realities’ of their identity and interest through the dynamic processes of social interaction and social definition” (Wendt 1992). This view acknowledges that social reality plays a crucial role in interactions between logical decision-making actors with competing preferences, proving particularly useful to explore the cultural nuance of Western hegemony, liberal intervention, and democratization.

When the United States abruptly ended its 20-year military and civil presence in Afghanistan under the order of President Biden, Kabul immediately descended into the control of the Taliban amidst disturbing reports of chaos in the sudden absence of American institutions and security forces (Stewart 2021). The Americans left Afghanistan having achieved its immediate goal - the complete destruction of Al-Qaeda, yet, public opinion of the invasion overwhelmingly expressed tepid disillusionment, painting the picture of the United States fleeing with its tail between its legs after overstaying its welcome.

Boots hit the ground in Kabul, Afghanistan under the name Operation Enduring Freedom for the first time in the aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks on the Twin Towers by Al-Qaeda (CFR 2024). President Bush famously remarked “Either you are with us or against us” (“President Declares ‘Freedom at War With Fear,”2001) – a threat not only to terrorist syndicates, but to the United States’ allies abroad. The message was clear: the United States was willing and able to act unilaterally in a manner that was both unprecedented and unparalleled, and anyone unwilling to cooperate was not only an enemy of the United States’ goals, but an enemy of the liberal world order.

It’s needless to say the United States has enjoyed substantial influence in the international system since the end of World War II, but this shift in approach marked its entry into total, unperturbed ideological hegemony. America was preparing to carry out its modern Manifest Destiny, with “democracy as a mission to transform the nature of the international political system” (Younus 2024). The United States had ceased to behave as an actor bound by international norms and law, but as the self-proclaimed architect of a new global democratic order.

Regime change in Afghanistan and installing a stable democratic politic was a developed intention of the twenty-year occupation, offering geostrategic, economic, and ideological value to the United States. Afghanistan physically occupies crucial territory in Central Asia, bordering untapped oil reserves and proximate to critical regional actors – Iran, China, and Russia (Khan 2021). The installation of a friendly democratic government in Afghanistan was a long-term goal, meant to outlast American military presence in the nation and continually serve Western means and ends.

Missteps in the discourse narrative of American presence in Afghanistan blossomed into tangible weaknesses as the new democratic infrastructure was built. The American-backed government in Afghanistan was quickly marred with reports of corruption, inefficiency, and general incompetency (Vittori 2021). The new government also crucially failed to consider the regional dynamics of Afghanistan – the central Kabli government had a low capacity to provide government services to remote villages and towns. Historically, Afghans have been more loyal to local leaders rather than national leaders, with a national identity having been cultivated largely through religious unity under Islam (Younus 2024). There was general agreement amongst Afghans that the government was perhaps out of its element: unable to function effectively and inherently incompatible with its environment.

The American approach to governance in Afghanistan was reductively monolithic - fueled by the potential construction of the “modern Afghan” society through liberal intervention. The US-backed government aimed to “civilize” the native Afghans via democratic infrastructure, essentially installing a government that would socialize Afghans to descriptively American political ideals including liberty equality, private ownership, individualism, free trade, and the rule of law (Younus 2024). However, the US critically failed to adapt to the existing socio-political norms of Afghanistan, exposing the cultural incongruency of liberal interventionism. US-Afghanistan relations consistently operated under the inference of Western socio-political dominance: the assumption that stability in Afghanistan could be achieved via democratic installation alone.

Throughout the US occupation, the government’s institutional inability to provide government services effectively and its ideological incongruence with the established social norms exposed weaknesses that were quickly exploited by remaining Taliban forces in the region.

In 2009, approximately half of Afghans reported sympathies for armed opposition groups, mainly the Taliban (CFR 2024). This can be attributed in one part to general discontent with the US-backed government and to the Taliban’s narrative of the Western occupation; that the Afghan identity was being endangered by foreigners who had installed an alien government that served its own agenda, not that of the Afghan people or of Islam.

Subsequently, the Taliban launched an ideological campaign under the concept of Jihad (a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam). They framed themselves as the preservers of the Afghan tradition against the onslaught of Western interference that hoped to strip them of their national identity (Younus 2024). Although general Afghan support for the Taliban or other militant groups weaned approaching the 2021 withdrawal of US troops (CFR 2024), the Taliban enjoyed particular popularity in remote villages and among religious-ethnic minorities (the particular groups being underserved by the existing government) (Younus 2024).

Once militarily driven out of Afghan territory, the Taliban had once again garnered notable political notoriety and was invited to the negotiating table by the United States in February 2020 to reach a peace agreement (CFR 2024). This was a notable departure from Bush-era rhetoric that lauded unitary American hegemony, with President Bush famously remarking that the United States doesn’t “negotiate with terrorists” (רC 2002), and perhaps an admission that the United States’ military might was simply not enough to achieve the societal transformation in Afghanistan that the Americans had envisioned. The peace deal called for a gradual reduction of American troops in exchange for the Taliban agreeing not to conduct terrorist activities on Afghan territory.

Despite reaching an agreement for measured peace, US troops and Taliban forces almost immediately engaged in combat when the Taliban launched dozens of assaults on Afghan security forces, prompting the US to respond with air strikes in Taliban strongholds (Rahim 2020). Taliban leaders argued that American presence in Afghanistan inherently communicated a narrative of undue foreign occupation and advocated for the reconstruction of the Afghan government through an Islamic system.

The Taliban and the US-backed Afghan government eventually re-engaged in lasting peace talks again in 2020, both expressing a desire to end violence in Afghanistan and to build a framework to allow for the departure of US troops (CFR 2024). In November 2020, the United States announced its plan to withdraw half of its troops before the inauguration of President Biden, with Biden announcing in April that the United States would not meet the deadline set under the U.S.-Taliban agreement and released a plan for a full withdrawal by September 11, 2021, ending the two-decade war. In August of 2021, the Taliban insurgency took control of Kabul with little resistance from both Afghan and US security forces (CFR 2024).

Reflecting on the end of the US’s involvement in the Afghanistan War, President Biden expressed that the United States “should learn from its mistakes” and that the withdrawal marks the end of “an era of major military operations to remake other countries” (“Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan.” 2021). As such, the United States tepidly walked away from its bold plan to establish a new liberal world order, acknowledging that the dreams of its “modern Manifest Destiny” were perhaps impetuously carried out.

The Western liberal model simply was not as one-size-fits-all as the United States had initially assumed, predicated on the shallow assumption that Afghan society needed to be modernized into Western ideals to achieve lasting peace. Not only was this approach inherently dehumanizing, but the inability of the US-backed government to institutionally acknowledge the Afghan tradition and sociopolitical norms with equity became its Achilles heel. The installed government failed to garner legitimacy from the Afghan people, failed to deliver crucial government services, and ultimately failed to introduce democratic ideals and lasting peace to Afghanistan. Taliban forces utilized this discontinuity in its insurgency efforts, and the United States, who once announced its bold plans to end terrorism in whatever way it deemed fit, was left with little choice but to reflect on its imprudence.

Works Cited:

Muhammad Ishaque Khan, Adeel Irfan, Aneel Waqas Khan. 2021. “Retreat of an Empire or End of an Era; Aftermath of US Withdrawal from Afghanistan”. Competitive Social Science Research Journal 2 (3):2(3),92-105. https://cssrjournal.com/index.php/cssrjournal/article/view/209.

Last U.S. troops depart Afghanistan after massive airlift ending ... Accessed March 4, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/last-us-forces-leave-afghanistan-after-nearly-20-years-2021-08-30/.

“Timeline: U.S. War in Afghanistan.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed March 4, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan.

National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed March 4, 2024. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

“What Is the Taliban?” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed March 4, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

“Text of Bush Middle East Speech.” רC News. Accessed March 4, 2024. https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80034&page=1.

Rahim, Najim, and Mujib Mashal. “Taliban Ramp up Attacks on Afghans after Trump Says ‘No Violence.’” The New York Times, March 4, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-violence.html.

“Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan.” The White House, August 31, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/.

Younus, Aisha. “The Failure of Liberal Interventionism: Deconstructing Afghan Identity Discourses of ‘Modern’ and ‘Tradition’: Article.” Politics and Governance, February 14, 2024. https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7380.

Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858.

Vittori, Jodi. “Corruption and Self-Dealing in Afghanistan and Other U.S.-Backed Security Sectors.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 9, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/09/corruption-and-self-dealing-in-afghanistan-and-other-u.s.-backed-security-sectors-pub-85303.

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The Demise of Democracy in El Salvador

Anonymous — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 16:59:17 +0000

The Demise of Democracy in El Salvador Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 03/28/2024 - 10:59 Kate Huntington

With a murder rate of around 52 per 100,000 residents, El Salvador has long been recognized as one of the most dangerous countries in the world (Statista 2023). However, in 2019, a new administration took office intending to rid the country of this notorious reputation. Nayibe Bukele was elected president after running on the campaign promise to reduce the country’s gang activity. Now five years later, President Nayib Bukele’s extensive crackdown on gang membership is attributed to the country’s revival. His popularity amongst the country’s residents is unrivaled evident through his landslide victory with 84.7% of votes during his 2024 campaign (BBC, 2024). His party, New Ideas, also experienced a sweeping victory in the country’s legislative assembly in 2021, allowing Bukele to implement major institutional changes during his first term as president.

Despite this widespread support, many are calling the legitimacy of Bukele’s second term into question. In May 2021, halfway through Bukele’s first tenure, the National Assembly, which had been overtaken by the New Ideas party, appointed new judges to the country’s highest court. Subsequently, mere months later, the court granted Salvadoran presidents the ability to hold office for two consecutive terms (BBC, 2021). Fast forward 3 years and around half of Bukele’s first term later and Bukele is the first Salvadoran president to exercise this newfound power, defeating his opponents for a second 5-year term. The New Ideas party also made massive gains in the country’s congress, winning 54 out of the 60 seats. The adjustment from 84 to 60 seats, an initiative Bukele spearheaded during his first term, may be partly to thank for this massive advantage taken by the New Ideas party. Now that a super-majority of Congress aligns ideologically with Bukele and only 3 seats belong to members of an opposition party (רC, 2024), Bukele has secured the ⅔ vote necessary for approving changes that will assist his gang-stopping scheme among other plans (BBC, 2021). In other words, there are less legislative checks on Bukele’s power.

As for the judicial branch, that too has fallen victim to Bukele’s executive aggrandizement (Contreras, 2022). In 2021, the Legislative Assembly announced that judges over 60 or with at least 30 years served will “cease their functions” (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Bukele claimed that the approval of the bills is an act of “purification of the Judicial System” and a removal of corrupt judges (Labrador, 2021), however, the bills have no mention of this being the reasoning behind the forced retirement. The bills retire nearly ⅓ of El Salvador’s judges and open up around 200 spots for new, loyalist judges who will uphold the agenda of Bukele and New Ideas (Human Rights Watch 2021). The highest court, the country’s supreme court has also been subject to changes by Bukele’s regime- 5 judges from the supreme court and the attorney general have all been ousted (BBC, 2021). The former attorney-general, Raúl Melara, was terminated from his role due to his suspected connection with ARENA, a right-wing opposition group (Reuters, 2021). His successor, Rodolfo Delgado, was approved by the assembly with 66 votes and backed by New Ideas (Reuters, 2021). These revisions to the state’s judicial branch further reduce the checks on Bukele’s power.

Despite concerns regarding the survival of democracy in the country, it seems as though a majority of citizens are celebrating Bukele’s second term. His crackdown on gang violence is praised by many. Salvadoran authorities state that the number of murders has decreased by 70% and that Bukele’s prolonged state of emergency is credited as the leading cause of this (Reuters, 2024). Over 74,000 people have been arrested in the country on suspicion of having ties to gangs, proving to be both relieving to the country’s citizens who can now enjoy peace of mind in the streets of their country, but also distressing for families of those who claim their family

members were wrongly detained (The Economist, 2024). With over 8% of young men in custody, trying all of them will be a lengthy process, and because few trials have already commenced, many are left to wonder how due process will play out in Bukele’s regime. Despite these concerns, the reduction of the homicide rate is undoubtedly commendable- until you consider the investigation led by the aforementioned former attorney general Raúl Melara, that is. His investigation claims that in 2020, members of El Salvador’s largest gangs negotiated with Bukele’s government officials in prison, where they exchanged better prison conditions and job opportunities for gang members for their commitment to keeping the country’s homicide rate down (Elfaro, 2021). Bukele denied these claims (Sherman, 2021). Then in May 2021, Melara was removed from office due to his close ties to opposition groups. This isn't the only controversy stemming from Bukele’s pursuit of ending gang violence. In 2020, in search of funds to finance a strong military and police force, Bukele made his way into the assembly along with a group of armed police. He aimed to get the assembly to pass a multi-million dollar loan that would support his plan for securing the country (BBC, 2020). The leader of the assembly in 2020 and a member of the National Coalition Party, Mario Ponce described Bukele’s actions as an “attempted coup d’etat” (France24, 2020). Mario Ponce is no longer a member of El Salvador’s legislative assembly.

The country of El Salvador is considered a “constitutional multiparty republic with a democratically elected government” (US Embassy, 2022). Anyone over the age of 18 may vote and the country is said to have free and fair elections according to observers abroad (US Department of State, 2009). Further, the country operates under a constitution that was established in 1983 (WIPO, 2014). Up until recently, the country has been dominated by two main parties, the Nationalist Republican Alliance and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. Bukele’s presidential run with his newly founded New Ideas party disrupted this tradition, practically redefining the country as a one-party state (Perelló & Navia, 2022). As of 2020, the country’s democratic institutions have earned it a freedom score of 66, or “partly free” (Freedom House, 2020). The country has been condemned by countries like the United States for undermining many democratic institutions. Still, Bukele has acquired unparalleled support not only from his constituents but from international onlookers. During a February 2024 visit to the United States, Bukele was cheered at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) as he urged conservatives to stand up against the “dark forces” of the country, claiming that El Salvador was an example of what happens when the dark forces take over (Licon, 2024). While some argue that Bukele’s actions are a step away from democracy, the Salvadoran president claims that the country had not known democracy until him and when asked about a possible third term, Bukele stated that Salvadorans have the right to amend the constitution to allow for this (The Economist, 2024). Currently, the constitution only permits presidents to hold two terms, but based on what has been observed, that can surely be subject to change.

Works Cited

“After Nayib Bukele’s Crushing, Unconstitutional Victory, What Next?” The Economist, February 5, 2024.

https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2024/02/05/after-nayib-bukeles-crushing-unconstitutional-victory-what-next.

“Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, El Salvador.” Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, El Salvador, WIPO Lex, 2014. https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/3769.

Contreras, Hugo Novales. “Democratic Backsliding as a Function of Transition Mode: The Cases of Guatemala and El Salvador,” 2022.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKE wi1xJCau9eEAxV_GDQIHdgCBeUQFnoECBsQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fknowledg e.uchicago.edu%2Frecord%2F4163%2Ffiles%2FNovales%252C%2520Hugo%2520-%2 520Democratic%2520Backsliding%2520as%2520a%2520Function%2520of%2520Trans ition%2520Mode%2520Guatemala%2520El%2520Salvador.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0g-pSA Mpo-H9skdyUEXdNw&opi=89978449.

“El Salvador (04/01).” U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 1, 2024. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/elsalvador/9352.htm.

“El Salvador 2022 Human Rights Report .” U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, 2022. https://sv.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/official-reports/hrr_2022/#:~:text=El%20Salva dor%20is%20a%20constitutional%20multiparty%20republic%20with%20a%20democrat ically%20elected%20government.

“El Salvador Court Rules Presidents Can Serve Two Consecutive Terms.” BBC News, September 4, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-58451370.

“El Salvador: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2020.

“El Salvador Re-Elects Attorney General Who Fed Friction with U.S. ...” Reuters, December 22, 2021.

https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-re-elects-attorney-general-who-fed-f riction-with-us-2021-12-22/.

“El Salvador Says Murders Fell by 70% after Gang Crackdown.” NBC News, January 4, 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/el-salvador-says-murders-fell-70-gang-crackdown -rcna132285.

“El Salvador: New Laws Threaten Judicial Independence.” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2021.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/02/el-salvador-new-laws-threaten-judicial-independe nce.

“El Salvador: New Laws Threaten Judicial Independence.” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2021.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/02/el-salvador-new-laws-threaten-judicial-independe nce.

“El Salvador Parliament Denounces President’s ‘Attempted Coup.’” BBC News, February 11, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51458947.

“El Salvador’s President Bukele Wins Re-Election by Huge Margin.” BBC News, February 5, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68196826.

France 24. “El Salvador President Accused of ‘Attempted Coup.’” France 24, February 11, 2020. https://www.france24.com/en/20200211-el-salvador-president-accused-of-attempted-cou p.

Janetsky, Megan. “El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele Takes Aim at Critics in Looking Ahead to 2nd Presidential Term.” AP News, February 26, 2024.

https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-nayib-bukele-president-reelection-ef04e20d90190 8099f4f787b841aca89#.

Labrador, Gabriel. “Asamblea de Bukele Reforma La Ley Para Purgar a UN Tercio de Los Jueces.” Elfaro, September 1, 2021.

https://elfaro.net/es/202109/el_salvador/25681/Asamblea-de-Bukele-reforma-la-ley-para purgar-a-un-tercio-de-los-jueces.htm.

Licon, Adriana Gomez. “El Salvador’s President Gets Rock-Star Welcome at Conservative Gathering Outside Washington.” רC News, February 22, 2024.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/el-salvadors-president-gets-rock-star-conservative gathering-107470693.

Martinez, Carlos, Gabriela Cáceres, and Óscar Martínez. “Criminal Investigation Found the Bukele Administration Hid Evidence of Negotiations with Gangs.” Criminal investigation found the Bukele Administration hid evidence of negotiations with gangs, August 23, 2021.

https://elfaro.net/en/202108/el_salvador/25670/Criminal-Investigation-Found-the-Bukele -Administration-Hid-Evidence-of-Negotiations-with-Gangs.htm.

“Murder Rate by Country 2023.” Statista, February 27, 2024.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/262963/ranking-the-20-countries-with-the-most-murde rs-per-100-000-inhabitants/#:~:text=World%27s%20most%20dangerous%20countries%2 02023%2C%20by%20homicide%20rate&text=El%20Salvador%20saw%20a%20murder, crime%20worldwide%20as%20of%202023.

Perelló, Lucas, and Patricio Navia. “The Disruption of an Institutionalised and Polarised Party System: Discontent with Democracy and the Rise of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador.” Politics 42, no. 3 (February 12, 2022): 267–88.

https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221077181.

Sherman, Christopher. “U.S. Treasury: El Salvador Government Negotiated with Gangs.” AP News, December 8, 2021.

https://apnews.com/article/nayib-bukele-el-salvador-gangs-c378285a36d55c18f741c3f65 892f801.

“US Concerned over Removal of Top Salvadorean Judges.” BBC News, May 3, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56970026.

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