

# DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS

Working Paper No. 04-02

## Stated Preference Analysis of Public Goods: Are we asking the right question?

Nicholas E. Flores

*Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder  
Boulder, Colorado*

Aaron Strong

*Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder  
Boulder, Colorado*

January 2004

Center for Economic Analysis  
Department of Economics



University of Colorado at Boulder  
Boulder, Colorado 80309

© 2004 Nicholas E. Flores and Aaron Strong

**Stated Preference Analysis of Public Goods:  
Are we asking the right question?**

Nicholas E. Flores  
Aaron Strong  
Department of Economics  
University of Colorado, UCB 256  
Boulder, CO 80309

January 22, 2004

# **Stated Preference Analysis of Public Goods: Are we asking the right question?**

## *Abstract*

In this paper we develop a simple question response model to dichotomous choice/referendum style stated preference questions. In our model, participants gather project information from the survey description, form a prior distribution of project costs, receive additional information through the survey's stated cost, and then respond to the dichotomous choice/referendum question with the belief that a yes increases the probability the project will be provided while a no decreases the probability the project will be provided. Based on our analysis we conclude that participants will generally not respond truthfully in the sense that they may say no to a stated cost that is less than their willingness to pay for a project or yes to a stated cost that is more than their willingness to pay. Given our findings, the resulting mean estimates will not in general be upwardly or downwardly biased. Rather the design of the stated costs used in the survey will influence the mean estimates from various studies in an unpredictable fashion. Our model predicts responses that are consistent with "yea-saying," answering yes to any stated cost

---

<sup>1</sup>We use the phrase “stated cost” to refer to the cost expressed in the survey while “cost” refers to the cost that will actually be realized if the project is implemented.

<sup>2</sup>For example see Alberini (1995).

<sup>3</sup>The good considered in Champ *et al.*

believed that the actual tax request would be different than the amount stated in the contingent valuation survey. As shown in the table below, the other provision formats produced similar results. Though these results are from a single study, the overall results suggest that credibility of the stated costs in contingent valuation questions may indeed be problematic.

Table 5 From Champ et al.,(2002):  
Distributions of Responses to Credibility Questions by Treatment

If a trust fund were actually set up (referendum held), do you think the amount you would be asked to donate (one-time tax assessment) would be \$(offer amount)?	Individual Contribution	Provision Point	Referendum
No, more	50%	40%	38%
No, less	13%	8%	4%
Yes	37%	52%	58%

Much of the discussion surrounding credibility in survey design has been on the plausibility of the scenarios presented to the participants. The emphasis has been on the other attributes of the potential project or program and not specifically on the stated costs. In their report on contingent valuation measurement of passive use values in natural resource damage assessment, Arrow *et al.* (1993) recommend posing contingent valuation questions as a dichotomous choice (yes/no/no vote) framed as a referendum on account of the potential for study participants to strategically misrepresent their preferences. Following up on this recommendation, Carson *et al.* (1999) draw on results from the mechanism design literature and conclude that the dichotomous choice/referendum format is superior to other available question formats with regard to strategic potential. The crux of the Carson *et al.* (1999) analysis is the consequential nature of participants' responses. A participant faces a stated referendum question

such as “if a referendum on this project at a cost of \$X to your household were held today, how would you vote: yes, no, not sure?” Carson *et al.* reason that if a yes vote increases the probability that the project is provided at the stated cost while a no vote decreases the probability that the project is provided at the stated cost, then utility-maximizing study participants should not misrepresent their preferences as long as the value of the project is positive under zero costs. While Carson *et al.* note that participants must find stated costs credible, their analysis does not address instances when this credibility is lacking or incomplete. Similarly Green *et al.* (1998) and Schläpfer (2002) warn that stated costs that lack credibility to participants will prove problematic for stated preference analysis.

the good or project being valued. The third section contains one or more valuation questions. Finally, the fourth section provides demographic questions. We focus our analysis on sections two and three of the survey, the project description and valuation question. Our analysis proceeds as follows. First we consider a specific form of indirect utility that exhibits risk neutrality with regard to individual cost uncertainty. Similar to Arrow and Fisher (1974), we consider a risk neutral form of indirect utility in order to avoid the situation where results are driven by the risk profile of preferences. The issues identified in our analysis will only be further exacerbated when preferences exhibit risk aversion or risk loving. Then given this specification of utility, we develop a formal procedure for organizing cost information that uses a Bayes decision rule in an expected utility framework. Participants form a prior distribution on the mean of uncertain costs, receive additional information on costs through stated costs, form a posterior distribution on the mean of costs and apply a Bayes decision rule to arrive at a decision. We use a Bayesian updating framework because it provides a complete analytical approach to receiving new information and making decisions under uncertainty. Though there may exist incomplete,

amounts in the double-bounded question sequence reveal information to the participant about their own value in a Bayesian framework. Though there may well be individual uncertainty regarding own valuation, we feel that a standard expected utility approach also deserves consideration, particularly given the evidence of stated cost/actual cost uncertainty revealed in the Champ *et al.* (2002) study.

## 2.1. Risk Neutral Utility Specification

Our first simplifying assumption is that for survey participant  $i$ , indirect utility is linear in the project and income. The project takes on a value of 1 if provided and zero otherwise. The

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Indirect Utility: } v(q, y) &\equiv \beta q + y \Rightarrow \\
 v(1, y - c_i) - v(0, y) &= \beta_i - c_i
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

---

<sup>4</sup>See Cameron (1988) and Hanemann (1984).



prior distribution of the mean of the cost distribution. We use 0 subscripts to signify prior information. This prior is completely known to  $i$  since it summarizes his uncertainty about the mean of the cost distribution which as an expected utility maximizer is his primary concern.

$$\text{Prior Distribution of } \mu: \quad \mu \sim N(\mu_0, \tau_0^2) \quad (2)$$

We interpret the parameter  $\tau_0^2$  to be the confidence that the individual has in their own knowledge about the expected costs of the project. More knowledge does not necessarily correlate to a smaller variance but may in fact result in a more diffuse prior. The density function of the prior is denoted  $g_0(\mu)$ . It is worth noting that a Bayes decision rule uses information on parameter uncertainty in combination with expected utility. Without any additional information,  $i$  considers whether  $E_{g(\mu)}[E_{f|c,g}]$  is positive or negative which reduces to a comparison

$$\text{Bayes Rule:} \quad P(A | B) = \frac{P(B | A)P(A)}{P(B)} \quad (3)$$

Putting things in terms of density functions, we can use Bayes rule to compute a new density function for the random mean parameter given the new information, which in this case is the stated cost which we denote as  $b_i$ . This new distribution of the random mean parameter is referred to as the posterior distribution. The posterior density takes the place of  $P(A | B)$ ; the prior density takes the place of  $P(A)$ ; and the density of  $b_i$  given  $\mu$  takes the place of  $P(B | A)$ . The unconditional or marginal density of  $b_i$  takes the place of  $P(B)$  in the denominator. In terms of density, the marginal density of  $b_i$  does not depend on  $\mu$  and is therefore viewed as a proportional factor which we denote with the symbol  $\propto$ . This proportional factor is a constant that basically scales the other factors so that integrating the posterior over  $\mu$  equals 1.

$$\text{Posterior Density of } \mu: \quad h(\mu | b_i) \propto f(b_i | \mu) g(\mu) \quad (4)$$

The posterior distribution summarizes  $i$ 's beliefs about uncertainty regarding the mean of the cost distribution after getting the stated cost information. In our application,  $i$  receives a signal through the stated cost  $b_i$  which  $i$  considers normally distributed with an unknown mean  $\mu$  (the same as the mean of the cost distribution) but with a variance  $\#^2$  which is subjectively known to  $i$  and depends on the credibility of signal. Less (more) credible signals imply a larger (smaller) variance. The distribution of  $b_i$  can be thought of as the distribution of  $b_i$  conditional on the unknown cost distribution mean  $\mu$ .

$$\text{Distribution of } b_i \text{ given } \mu: \quad b_i \sim N(\mu, \#^2) \quad (5)$$

Given the assumptions made so far, the posterior distribution of the unknown mean of costs given the stated cost signal is also normally distributed.

*Posterior Distribution of  $\mu$  given  $b_i$ :  $\mu|b_i \sim N \left( \quad \quad \quad \right)$*

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Bayes Decision: Favor Project} &\Leftrightarrow E_{h(\mu|b_i)}[E_{f(c|\mu)}(b_i - c)] > 0. \\
&\Leftrightarrow b_i > \frac{\sigma_0^2 b_i}{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma^2} + \frac{\sigma^2 \mu_0}{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma^2}
\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Thus, there is a subjective benefit-cost at the individual level. Individuals are comparing their posterior expected costs with their personal benefits from the project.

As with Carson *et al.* (1999), we assume that the probability of the project being provided increases with the mean estimate from the inferred distribution of population willingness to pay. We further assume that the decision to implement is a “one-shot” decision. Denying this project does not affect the probability of providing alternative projects. The choice we model is binary and one shot. Therefore conditioned on the information in the posterior, participants should responded truthfully in the sense they vote yes for projects that have higher expected utility and no for those with lower expected utility. With this in mind, we now turn to three cases of outcomes.

### 3. Three Cases

There are three important cases of resulting posteriors. The first case is when the posterior distribution is degenerate and all support is on the stated cost from the survey. That is, the participant completely ignores the prior in favor of the information provided in the survey. The second case is when the posterior distribution is independent of the stated cost information, *i.e.* the participant completely discounts the stated cost information provided in the survey, resulting in a posterior cost distribution is identical to the prior cost distribution. The third case is when the posterior distribution is influenced by the stated cost amount, but there is posterior

support for costs other than the stated cost amount.

### 3.1. Case 1: Degenerate Support

This first case, when the posterior distribution is degenerate and all support is on the stated cost, requires that participants completely abandon their prior distribution in favor of the cost stated in the survey. Participant  $i$  receives the stated cost information and believes that the project will cost  $b_i$ . Our model produces this case when credibility of the stated cost information is absolute which occurs when  $\beta = 0$ . Letting  $\beta$  go to zero results in a posterior with mean  $b_i$  and variance zero. In turn, this implies that a yes vote will occur if and only if a participant's realized willingness to pay/compensating variation is greater than  $b_i$ . Note that this would be true even if the indirect utility function did not exhibit risk neutrality.

This is the case emphasized by Carson *et al.* (1999). When willingness to pay exceeds  $b_i$ , the participant prefers implementation of the project and votes yes, thus increasing the probability of provision. In terms of misrepresentation of preferences, the one-shot assumption is important. As Carson *et al.* point out, if the decision can be revisited, then the participant may want to reject the project at the stated cost, even though the project will provide a utility gain, in hopes that a different, more favorable project will be presented. It is worth noting that if only rejected projects result in the presentation of an alternative, then misrepresentation is only in a downward direction. The only possibility for strategic misrepresentation is to say no even though their willingness to pay exceeds  $b_i$ . Saying yes to a project for which willingness to pay is less than  $b_i$  will only result in the higher probability of implementing a project that results in an ex-post utility loss. Given this line of reasoning, it is apparent why Carson *et al.* (1999) conclude that the referendum format is superior. This is the standard case dealt with in the literature,

where credibility of the stated costs is taken for granted.

### **3.2. Case 2: Posterior Bid Independence**

The second case is the opposite extreme. Participants put no weight whatsoever on the bid information and so the posterior exactly equals the prior. Our model produces this case when credibility of the stated cost information is zero which is represented by a  $\beta$  tending to infinity. Letting  $\beta$  go to infinity results in a normal posterior with mean  $\mu_0$  and variance  $\sigma_0^2$ . Participants effectively ignore the bid information and base their consequential responses according to whether they prefer the project is implemented given their prior distribution. They are essentially answering the question whether or not they want the project implemented given what they perceive as the cost potential.


The fact that participants are basically answering a different question takes away any pretense of truthful response in the sense that we obtain information on an individual's realized gross value for the project based on their prior distribution. Participants can provide what appear to be truthful responses in the sense that they may coincidentally answer yes to a stated cost amount for which their willingness to pay is larger or similarly they may say no to a bid amount for which their willingness to pay is smaller. However, there will be cases for which they answer yes when their willingness to pay is smaller than the bid and no when their willingness to pay is larger. At issue is whether a given participant wants the project implemented given their perceived cost potential. Those wanting to increase the probability of project provision will say yes regardless of the stated cost amount they face and those wanting to decrease the probability of project provisions will say no regardless of the stated cost amount. In this extreme case, the stated cost presented in the valuation question has absolutely no influence on their response.

### 3.3. Case 3: Stated Cost Influence of the Posterior

Intermediate to the two cases discussed above is the situation when the stated cost influences the posterior distribution, but not completely as in the first case discussed above. This case encompasses instances when given a bid design, the best response will effectively take the form of either case one or case two. In our model with risk neutrality, it is the resulting mean of the prior that matters which is easy to graphically depict as in Figure 1. Let us consider the case where the prior mean,  $\mu$ , exceeds  $i$ 's willingness to pay  $v_i$ .<sup>5</sup> Absent stated cost information, the

---

<sup>5</sup>For this example failing to answer truthfully is a no vote. The mirror image is when the prior mean falls below willingness to pay and the stated cost is above. Failing to respond truthfully in this mirror case is a yes vote. By providing our particular example we do not intend to downplay the mirror case.



Overall the intermediate case suggests that participants may or may not be responding truthfully in the sense that they are only saying yes when their willingness to pay is greater than the stated cost amount and they are only saying no when their willingness to pay is less than the stated cost amount. Taken together, our analysis suggests that truthful response in the context of referendum style valuation questions with designed and varying stated costs is not by any means guaranteed, but at the same time is not altogether ruled out.

#### **4. Estimation Errors**

Given the potential problems identified by our analysis, we now turn to a discussion of the implications for estimating the distribution of willingness to pay. Suppose that a participant feels their realized cost under project implementation will be higher than the stated amount but answers yes to the referendum question. In our simple model this corresponds to the situation in



which the stated cost falls below the posterior mean which falls below willingness to pay,

$b_i < \mu_1 < !_i$ . A researcher using standard techniques correctly infers that the participant's



credible presentation of costs, there will be no variation in the stated costs of the project and the estimation will not be identified. A cost sharing mechanism assigns a portion of the cost paid for by a one-time tax at the local level and a one-time tax at the federal level. Let  $\alpha$  denote the proportion of the amount paid for at the local level. Denote the populations of taxpayers in the federal and local jurisdictions respectively as  $N_{fed}$  and  $N_{loc}$ . For an  $\alpha$  cost share, the cost for a local individual is given as follows.

$$C_{loc} = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\$}{N_{fed}} + \alpha \frac{\$}{N_{loc}} \quad (9)$$

We consider three cases for  $\alpha = 0$ ,  $\alpha = 1$ , and  $0 < \alpha < 1$ . As is standard in the literature, we will assume that the cost of the project is small relative to the economy. Thus,  $\$/N_{fed}$  is small for any  $\$$  that is small relative to the size of the economy. That is, we may assume that any increase in federal taxes for a specific project will be negligible. To put this into perspective, suppose that a project has a cost of \$10 million, then  $\$/N_{fed} \approx 0.04$ . Given small individual federal costs, the cost to a local resident is almost entirely made up of the local portion of cost. Under these conditions we can use  $\alpha$  to vary credible costs between 0 and  $\$/N_{loc}$ . Varying  $\alpha$  will provide the necessary variation to identify the mean of the population distribution of willingness to pay. Through the cost share we can justify the use of variations in stated cost as long as the cost sharing financing structure is the credible

## 6. Conclusion

Referendum style valuation questions in the context of varying stated costs that have no relation to project costs can create a situation in which participants are essentially answering a

completely different question than the one posed by the researcher.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Stated cost design conjoint analysis applied to public goods will face the same problems as those identified in section 2.

## 7. References

Alberini, Anna. 1995. Optimal Designs for Discrete Choice Contingent Valuation Surveys: Single-Bound, Double-Bound, and Bivariate Models. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 28 (3):287-306.

Arrow, Kenneth J., and Anthony C. Fisher. 1974. Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility.

Green, Donald, Karen E. Jacowitz, Daniel Kahneman, and Daniel McFadden. 1998. Referendum Contingent Valuation, Anchoring, and Willingness to Pay for Public Goods. *Resource and Energy Economics* 20:85-116.

Hanemann, W. Michael. 1984. Welfare Evaluations in Contingent Valuation Experiments with Discrete Responses. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 66 (3):332-341.

Herriges, Joseph A., and Jason F. Shogren. 1996. Starting Point Bias in Dichotomous Choice Valuation with Follow-Up Questioning. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 30 (1):112-131.

Schläpfer, Felix. 2002. A Note on the Issue of Incentive Compatibility in Referendum-format CVM. Institut für Umweltwissenschaften, University of Zurich.

Thurstone, L. L. 1927. A Law of Comparative Judgement. *Psychological Review* 34 (273-286).