

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
Department of Economics

Economics 7030-001

Microeconomic Theory 2

Spring 2010

Professor Jennifer Lamping

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Lectures: TR 3:30pm - 4:45pm, Economics 119

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Course Website: CULearn

Course Description

This course is the second of three semester courses that develop the basic tools and results of modern microeconomic analysis. The second semester course covers choice under uncertainty, game theory, and topics in industrial organization.

The course is highly technical. Mathematical tools will be taught as needed, but it is assumed that you are comfortable with formal proofs.

Course Structure

The course will consist of lectures, readings, assignments, and exams. Readings will be primarily from the required textbooks, _____ by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green and _____ by Fudenberg and Tirole. Additional readings will be made available on the course website.

Assignments will take the form of problem sets. In general, assignments will be made available every Tuesday on the course website and due in lecture one week later. Solutions will be posted on the course website shortly thereafter. Assignments are to be completed in groups of three to four students. Groups will be assigned on the first day of class.

There will be two midterm exams and one final exam. Exams will be held in class and completed individually.

Grading

The various components of the course will be weighted as follows to determine your final grade:

Assignments	10%
Midterm Exam	45%
Final Exam	45%

The midterm and final exams will each be graded on a 100 point scale with points allotted on the basis of the accuracy of your answers. In contrast, assignments will be graded on a scale from 0 to 2: 0 points for not handing it in, 1 point for a below average performance, and 2 points for an above average performance.

Missed Assignments & Exams

Late assignments will not be accepted since solutions are posted online shortly after the assignment is due. You may not miss an exam. No makeup exams will be given.

Textbooks

The required textbooks are

- by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole
- by Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green

The following texts offer different presentations of the material in Fudenberg and Tirole. I urge you to obtain one or more of these texts to assist you in understanding the material.

- by Prajit K. Dutta
- by Robert Gibbons
- by Roger B. Myerson
- by Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
- by Joel Watson

If you find that you are having trouble with the mathematics used in this course, I recommend obtaining one or more of the following texts as references:

- by Kim C. Border
- by Alpha C. Chiang and Kevin Wainwright
- by Michael Hoy, John Livernois, Chris McKenna, Ray Rees, and Thanasis Stengos
- by Efe A. Ok
- by Carl P. Simon and Lawrence E. Blume
- by Rangarajan K. Sundaram
- by Knut Sydsaeter, Peter Hammond, Atle Seierstad, and Arne Strom
- by Darrell A. Turkington

Other Readings

The following papers are required reading:

- Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. **89:** 488-500.
- Gul, F. (1997). A Nobel Prize for game theorists: The contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten. **11:** 159-174.
- Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. **90:** 629-649.
- Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. **87:** 355-374.

The following papers are recommended reading:

- Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players: Part I. **14:** 159-182.
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1968a). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players: Part II. **14:** 320-334.
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1968b). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players: Part III. **14:** 486-502.
- Kuhn, H. W. (1953). Extensive games and the problem of information. In . vol. 2, edited by H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 193-216.
- Myerson, R. B. (2004). Comments on “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, I-III”: Harsanyi’s games with incomplete information. **50:** 1818-1824.
- Nash, J. F. (1950a). The Bargaining Problem. **18:** 155-162.
- Nash, J. F. (1950b). Equilibrium points in n-person games. **36:** 48-49.
- Nash, J. F. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. **21:** 128-140.
- Riley, J. G. (2001). Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling. **39:** 432-478.
- Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. **50:** 97-109.
- Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. **4:** 25-55.
- Wilson, C. (1977). A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. **16:** 167-207.

All of these papers are available on the course website.

Tentative Course Schedule

Date	Topic	Required Readings	Assignments
	Choice under Uncertainty		
Jan 12	Introduction	MWG 6.A	
Jan 14	Expected Utility Theory	MWG 6.B	
		Recommended Readings: Border 3	
Jan 19	Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion	MWG 6.C	PSet 1 Due
Jan 21	Comparison of Payoff Distributions	MWG 6.D	
	Static Games of Complete Information		
Jan 26	Strategic Form Games	Gul (1997); FT 1.1	PSet 2 Due
Jan 28	Nash Equilibria	FT 1.2	
Feb 02	Nash Equilibria: Existence and Properties	Sundaram 9.4; FT 1.3	PSet 3 Due
		Recommended Readings: Border 6 & 15; Nash (1950b); Nash (1953)	
Feb 04	Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability	FT 2.1	
	Dynamic Games of Complete Information		
Feb 09	Extensive Form Games	FT 3.1 - 3.4	PSet 4 Due
		Recommended Readings: Kuhn (1953)	
Feb 11	Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection	FT 3.5 - 3.6 & 4.2	
		Recommended Readings: Selten (1975)	
Feb 16	Midterm Exam 1	3:30pm - 4:45pm Economics 119	
Feb 18	Bargaining: Nash	Osborne & Rubinstein 15	
		Recommended Readings: Nash (1950a)	
Feb 23	Bargaining: Rubinstein-Stahl	FT 4.4	PSet 5 Due
		Recommended Readings: Rubinstein (1982)	
Feb 25	Infinitely Repeated Games	FT 4.3 & 5.1	

Mar 02	Folk Theorem	FT 5.1	PSet 6 Due
Mar 04	Finitely Repeated Games	FT 5.2	
	Static Games of Incomplete Information		
Mar 09	Bayesian Equilibria	FT 6.1 - 6.4 Recommended Readings: Myerson (2004); Harsanyi (1967), (1968a), & (1968b)	PSet 7 Due
Mar 11	Bayesian Equilibria: Examples	FT 6.5	
Mar 16	Purification of Mixed Strategy Equilibria	FT 6.7	PSet 8 Due
	Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information		
Mar 18	Perfect Bayesian Equilibria	FT 8.1 - 8.2 Recommended Readings: Selten (1975)	
Mar 23	No Classes (Spring Break)		
Mar 25	No Classes (Spring Break)		
Mar 30	Sequential Equilibria	FT 8.3	PSet 9 Due
Apr 01	Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibria	FT 8.4	
Apr 06	Midterm Exam 2	3:30pm - 4:45pm Economics 119	
Apr 08	Proper Equilibria	FT 8.4	
	Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening		
Apr 13	Adverse Selection	MWG 13.A - 13.B; Akerlof (1970)	PSet 10 Due
Apr 15	Signaling	MWG 13.C; Spence (1973)	
Apr 20	Screening	MWG 13.D;	

University Policies

Academic Misconduct

All students of the University of Colorado at Boulder are responsible for knowing and adhering to the academic integrity policy of this institution. Violations of this policy may include cheating, plagiarism, aid of academic dishonesty, fabrication, lying, bribery, and threatening behavior. All incidents of academic misconduct shall be reported to the Honor Code Council (honor@colorado.edu, (303) 735 2273). Students who are found to be in violation of the academic integrity policy will be subject to both academic sanctions from the faculty member and non-academic sanctions (including but not limited to university probation, suspension, or expulsion). Other information on the Honor Code can be found at www.colorado.edu/policies/honor.html and at www.colorado.edu/academics/honorcode.