

# MENGQI ZHANG

Department of Economics, University of Colorado Boulder, 256 UCB Boulder, CO 80309

+1(720)-266-8863 mengqi.zhang@colorado.edu

<https://sites.google.com/colorado.edu/mengqi-zhang>

## EDUCATION

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<b>University of Colorado Boulder</b> <i>Ph.D. in Economics</i>	<i>Expected Spring 2025</i>
<b>University of Colorado Boulder</b> <i>M.A. in Economics</i>	<i>2019</i>
<b>Shanghai Jiao Tong University</b> <i>Master's Program in Economics</i>	<i>2017</i>
<b>South China University of Technology</b> <i>B.A. in Economics</i>	<i>2014</i>

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Microeconomic Theory (Information and Mechanism Designs), Industrial Organization, Marketing

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### "Receiver Inattention and Persuading to be Persuaded"

Frictions in a Bayesian persuasion game, such as the receiver's rational inattention, can constrain the feasible information structures beyond Bayes' plausibility. In a conventional persuasion scenario with a binary state and binary action, we examine the properties of the inattention constraint under which the sender is likely to benefit from extending the persuasion game. These properties transform the sender's persuasion problem into an intertemporal one, where her strategy not only determines the current chance to succeed but also the receiver's prior belief in the next persuasion attempt, if necessary. In contrast to the optimal static persuasion strategy, the intertemporal approach may lead the sender to adopt a "piecemeal" information disclosure strategy, where she sacrifices the chance of immediate success to ensure that the receiver can be persuaded in subsequent attempts should her current attempt fail. While extending the persuasion game can improve overall persuasiveness beyond the static efficiency level, frictional constraints continue to define the efficiency limits of this sequential strategy. Friction-free efficiency remains unattainable, even with unlimited opportunities to persuade.

### "Price Signal in Conspicuous Consumption"

In conspicuous consumption, if consumers lack information about market demand, they are uncertain about the exclusivity for which they are willing to pay a premium. The price set by a monopolistic firm with an information advantage can be a signal of product exclusivity to consumers. In a signaling game, we show that the consumer's heuristic, that higher prices justify higher levels of exclusivity, supports the equilibria where prices are pooling or separating signals. In these equilibria, as compared to the perfect-information benchmark, the firm earns a higher profit in the premium luxury market, where most potential consumers are high-type, and a lower profit in the affordable luxury market, where there

is a large proportion of low-type consumers. In addition, the difference in consumption value between

2023 Hong Kong Economic Association Biennial Conference (HKU, Hong Kong)	<i>December, 2023</i>
2023 Midwest Theory Conference (Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA)	<i>November, 2023</i>
2023 INFORMS Annual Meeting (Phoenix, AZ)	<i>October, 2023</i>

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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### Instructor

Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory *Fall 2019*

### Teaching Assistant

Intermediate Microeconomic Theory *Spring 2022, Fall 2022*

Introduction to Statistics with Computer Applications *Fall 2023*

Principles of Microeconomics *Spring 2018, Spring 2020 - Fall 2021*

Principles of Macroeconomics *Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Spring 2019, Spring 2023, Spring 2024*

Natural Resource Economics *Fall 2017*

Advanced Microeconomic Theory *Fall 2015*

## ACADEMIC AWARDS

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Sieglinde Talbott Haller Endowed Economics Scholarship *2021*

Paula M. Hildebrandt Economics Graduate Student Support Award *2020*

Morris E. Garnsey Fellowship *2019*

Yordon Prize in Microeconomics *2018*

Robert and Lauri McNown Award *2018*

Bacon Family Fellowship *2017*

## LANGUAGES

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English (Fluent), Mandarin (Native), Cantonese (Native)

## REFERENCES

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Jin-Hyuk Kim  
Associate Professor of Economics  
Department of Economics  
University of Colorado Boulder  
jinhyuk.kim@colorado.edu

Piotr Dworczak  
Associate Professor of Economics  
Department of Economics  
Northwestern University  
piotr.dworczak@northwestern.edu

Yongmin Chen  
Professor of Economics  
Department of Economics  
University of Colorado Boulder  
yongmin.chen@colorado.edu

Chuan He  
Professor of Strategy,  
Entrepreneurship and Operations  
Leeds School of Business  
University of Colorado Boulder  
chuan.he@colorado.edu