Econ 8747: Industrial Organization Theory

Fall 2022

Professor Yongmin Chen

Office: Econ 108

Class Time: TTH: 2:00-3:15 PM

Office Hours: Wednesday: 11:15-3:15 PM.

Recommended books: (1) The Theory of Industrial Organization by Jean Tirole (1988), MIT

Press, (2) Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Practice by Pepall, Richards, and

Norman, and (3) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3 (HIO 3, 2007, Mark Armstrong and

Robert Porter edits). HIOt THI deflection (No. 1) (No. 1

A tentative course schedule is as follows. There can be changes to this schedule during the semester, which will be announced in class. You are responsible for updating course information according to announcements made in class. The starred articles are required readings. You should also read additional asigned articles (at least b riefly), especially on topics that you would like to explore more. You will be asked to write short reviews/discussions of some papers (each

review/discussion is about 2 pages long, double spaced; but occasionally you may do a longer review). When you review a paper, you may provide a summary, discuss the research question(s),

- *Ellison, Glenn, "A Model of Add on Pricing" QJE, 2005
- *Ellison, Glenn, "Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization", 2006, MIT.
- Shota Ichihashi, "Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers", AER, 2020.
- Justin P Johnson, David P Myatt, "On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and product design", AER, 2006.
- Maskin, E., and J. Riley, "Monopoly with Incomplete Information", RAND, 1984.
- *Chen, Y. and M. Riordan, "Profitability of Product Bundling", IER, 2013.
- Chen, Y. and M. Schwartz, "Differential Pricing when Costs Differ: A Welfare Analysis", RAND, 2015.
- *Monika Mrázová and J. Peter Neary, "Not So Demanding: Demand Structure and Firm Behavi 1 **Mg/Bd/D/S**chwart. -0 0 12 1002 Twad = & fX3,pD Aq@-& A36/L/F:@£04 108 5 Tw Td(E)Tj0.61

- Carl Shapiro (2021), "Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure Lessons from the *AT&T/Time Warner* Case", *Review of Industrial Organization*.
- *"Horizontal Merger Guidelines", FTC and DOJ, 2010. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf

Assignment 6 (due 10/11): Reviews: Salop and Scheffman (1983); Moresi and Salop (2021).

Student Presentation 2 (10/11): "Horizontal Merger Guidelines" by FTC and DOJ, 2010; Moresi and Salop (2021).

5. Dynamic Competition

10/13, 10/18, 10/20, 10/25

- Strategic Behavior: Ideas and Applications
- Dynamic Price Competition
- Repeated Interactions and Collusion

• *Fudenberg, D and J. Tirole, "Consumer Poaching and Brand Switching," RAND (2001), 634-657

Assignment 7 (due 10/20): Exercise 6.1-6.10 in Tirole.

Assignment 8 (due 10/27): Reviews: Taylor (2003), and Bernheim and Madsen (2017).

Student Presentation 3 (10/27): Taylor (2003); Bernheim and Madsen (2017)

Planning for Term Paper

6. Privacy, Data, and Information Security

10/28, 11/1, 11/3

Readings:

- *Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A.&Ozdaglar, A. (2019), 'Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data markets', NBER Working Paper No. 26296.
- Daron Acemoglu, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asu Ozdaglar, "Network security and contagion", JET, 2016.
- *Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A. & Gan, T. (2019), 'The economics of social data', Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper.
- Shota Ichihashi, "Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers", AER, 2020.
- Richard Posner, "The Economics of Privacy", AER, 1981.
- Alessandro Acquisti, Curt Taylor and Liad Wagman, "The Economics of Privacy,"
 Journal of Economic Literature, June 2016.
- *Curt Taylor, "Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information", RAND, 2004.
- Athey, S. and J. Gans (2010). The impact of targeting advertising technology on advertising markets and media competition. AER, 100 (2), 608–613.
- Anderson, R. and T. Moore (2006). The economics of information security. Science 314 (5799), 610–613.
- Goldfarb, A. and C. Tucker (2011). Privacy regulation and online advertising. Management Science 57 (1), 57–71.
- Haan, M. A. and Moraga-González, J. L. (2011). "Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model." Economic Journal, Vol. 121, pp. 552--579.

- Sanjeev Goyal and Adrien Vigier, "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks", REStud., 2014.
- Chen, Y. "Marketing Innovation", JEMS, 2006.
- Chen, Y., X. Hua, and K. Maskus, "International Protection of Consumer Data". Journal of International Ecoomics, 2021.

Assignment 9 (due 11/1): Reviews: Bergemann et al. (2019); Taylor (2004); Ichihashi (2020).

Student Presentations 4 (11/4): Two of the three papers abo

- Justin Johnson, "The Agency Model and MFN", Review of Economic Studies, 2017
- Hagiu, A., and B. Jullien, "Search Diversion and Platform Competition," IJIO, 2014.
- Armstrong, M, Vickers, J, and Zhou, J., "Prominence and Consumer Search", RAND, 2009.

Assignment 10 (due 11/10): Reviews: de Cornière and Taylor (2013); Johnson (2017); Rhodes et al. (2021).

Presentations 5 (11/10): two of the three papers above.

Working on the Term Paper

8. Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights

11/15, 11/27, 11/29, 12/1, 12/6

A. Overview

- Basic Questions for the Economic Analysis of Innovation
- Some Statistics about Innovation Inputs and Outputs
- Analytical Framework

B. Market Structure and Innovation Incentive

- The Schumpeterian View (1942)
- Arrow's Analysis (1962): Process Innovation
- Preempting Monopoly: Gilbert and Newbery (1982)
- Product Innovation: When is Arrow's Ranking Reversed?
- Vertical Organization and Innovation Incentive
- Exclusive Contracts and Innovation

C. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Innovation

• The Fundamental Trade-off: Static v

- Antitrust and Innovation
- Patent Damages/Remedies
- IPRs and Continual Innovation
- IPRs and Innovation in Developing Countries

Readings:

- U.S. National Science Board. "Science and Engineering Indicators 2014". http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/
- Arrow, K. (1962). "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovations," R. Nelson ed. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press.
- Chen, Y and T. Puttitanun (2005). "Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries", Journal of Development Economics, 78: 474-493.
- *Gilbert, R. and Newbery, D. (1982). "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, 72: 514-526.
- Chen, Y and M. Schwartz (2013). "Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
- Chen, Y and D. Sappington (2010). "Innovation in Vertically Related Markets", Journal of Industrial Economics.
- Chen, Y and D. Sappington (2011). "Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare", American Economic Journals: Microeconomics.
- Ch4ov

- Scotchmer, Suzanne. 2004. *Innovation and Incentives*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- *Segal, I. and M. Whinston. (2007) "Antitrust in Innovative Industries". American Economic Review.
- Shapiro, C. (2016). "Patent Remedies," American Economic Review, 106: 198-202.

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University Policies

Classroom Behavior

environment. Information on requesting accommodations is located on the <u>Disability Services website</u>. Contact Disability Services at 303-492-8671 or <u>dsinfo@colorado.edu</u> for further assistance. If you have a temporary medical condition, see <u>Temporary Medical Conditions</u> on the Disability Services website.

Preferred Student Names and Pronouns

CU Boulder recognizes that students' legal information doesn't always align with how they identify. Students may update their preferred names and pronouns via the student portal; those preferred names and pronouns are listed on instructors' class rosters. In the absence of such updates, the name that appears on the class roster is the student's legal name.

Honor Code

All students enrolled in a University of Colorado Boulder course are responsible for knowing and adhering to the Honor Code. Violations of the Honor Code may include, but are not limited to: plagiarism, cheating, fabrication, lying, bribery, threat, unauthorized access to academic materials, clicker fraud, submitting the same or similar work in more than one course without permission from all course instructors involved, and aiding academic dishonesty. All incidents of academic misconduct will be reported to Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution (honor@colorado.edu); 303-492-5550). Students found responsible for violating the Honor Code will be assigned resolution outcomes from the Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution as well as be subject to academic sanctions from the faculty member. Additional information regarding the Honor Code academic integrity policy can be found on the Honor

Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to deal reasonably and fairly with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. See the <u>campus policy regarding religious observances</u> for full details.